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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
However, this is not to say that Congress' hands are tied
in dealing with propaganda of this type. The purpose of the statute
in the instant case was to protect the American people from the
subversive ideas disseminated by this propaganda. This purpose
can just as easily be attained if Congress apprises the citizenry
of the fact that large quantities of propaganda are being introduced
into the United States from abroad, and that all citizens who do
not wish to receive this mail can so notify the Post Office, and have
it detained there.
In conclusion, the principal case indicates the Supreme Court's
growing discontent with indirect governmental interference with
freedom of speech through control of the mails. The case represents
a further judicial extension of first amendment's guarantees and
will provide a precedent for future cases in which petitioners allege
unconstitutional restrictions upon derivative first amendment
rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO TRAVEL - PROHIBITION ON
TRAVEL TO CUBA UPHELD AS VALID AREA RETRICTION.-In com-
pliance with a requirement of the Department of State, the plaintiff
applied for validation of his passport for travel to Cuba. The
request was denied on the ground that it was not in the best interest
of the United States to allow tourist travel to Cuba, and the
plaintiff brought suit against the Secretary of State. In affirming a
special three-judge district court's dismissal of the action, the United
States Supreme Court, on direct appeal,' held that refusal to validate
a passport for travel to Cuba was a proper exercise of power by the
Secretary of State under the Passport Act of 1926, and was not an
unconstitutional deprivation of plaintiff's right to travel. Zernel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
The use of passports and the concept of the right to travel
have distinct histories which did not merge until recent years. The
term passport arose in relation to a privilege afforded an alien or
foreign ambassador to pass safely through the territory of the issuing
sovereign. 2 Later, passports evolved into documents issued to the
citizens of a country, solely for the purpose of identifying the
bearer in order to insure his safety while traveling in foreign
countries.3 It was never a requirement that a traveler obtain a
passport in order to leave the United States.4
'28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
2 Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FORMGN Ar-
FAms 17 (1956).




The right to travel, which is ingrained in English common
law, was expressly provided for in the Magna Carta,5 and was
described by Blackstone as a personal liberty "consisting in the
power . . . of moving one's person to whatever place one's in-
clination may direct." 6 In the United States, the right to travel
enjoyed a comparable status,7 and consequently, any congressional
action dealing with passport issuance only attempted to facilitate,
and not to regulate, travel." The right to travel was treated his-
torically as a right to travel within the United StatesY
The first congressional regulation of passports, enacted in 1803,
declared it unlawful to issue a passport to an alien who represented
himself to be a citizen. 10 The practice of issuing passports to anyone
who could prove himself a citizen was ended after the Civil War,
when an oath of allegiance was required of an applicant." No
longer was a passport "an act of government to which the citizen
is entitled precisely because he is a citizen." 12 Legislation in 1856
placed passport issuance exclusively within the domain of the De-
partment of State.13 This act, which remains in force today as the
Passport Act of 1926,'14 centralized the issuance of passports in
order to eliminate confusion and to remedy the abuses practiced upon
the unwary by many unauthorized persons purporting to issue pass-
ports.15 The power to issue passports became discretionary with
5 Magna Carta, ch. 42 (1215).
6 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAaMS* 134.
7 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1957), wherein the Court stated:
"freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values," and which contains
an excellent history of regulation of the right to travel.
s Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUm. L. Rsv. 47,
52-53 (1956).
9 In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867), the right
to travel was stated to be "in its nature independent of the will of any
State over whose soil [a person] . . . must pass in the exercise of it."
In 1900, the Supreme Court specifically termed the right to travel within this
country an "attribute of personal liberty," which is "secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." Williams
v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900). Again, in 1941, the Court dealt with
a citizen's right to travel within the United States and struck down a
restriction on migrant workers on the basis of the commerce clause. Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The majority reasoned that interstate
commerce was adversely affected by denying workers in search of em-
ployment the right to travel from state to state.
102 Stat. 205 (1803).
i Jaffe, supra note 2, at 22.
12 Boudin, supra note 8, at 52.
13 Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 52, 60-61. This act authorized the
Secretary of State to "grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the
President shall designate and prescribe, and no other person shall grant,
issue or verify such passports."
1444 Stat 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
25 3 MooRE, INT ERATiONAL LAW DIGEST 862-63 (1906).
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the Secretary of State,1 6 and this authority was recognized by both
the United States Supreme Court 17 and the President-
The Secretary of State exercised his discretion in 1903 by
rejecting the application of all those who desired a passport for
unlawful or improper purposes. 19  The Department also denied
passports to communists, or to those whose activities abroad were
contrary to the laws or interests of the United States.20  Between
1917 and 1931, the Department refused passports to American com-
munists who desired to leave the country for purposes of indoctrina-
tion or instruction in communism.21 In 1948, passports were
denied to those whom the Department deemed to be traveling abroad
with the intention of subverting the interests of the United States. 22
In addition, passports have been denied to "political adventurers,"
and "revolutionary radicals." 23
Historically, the right of an American citizen to travel abroad
was not dependent upon the issuance of a passport by the Secretary
of State, except during war time.2 4  However, in 1941, Congress
extended this requirement 25 to include foreign travel during those
periods designated by the President as national emergencies. 26  This
provision was superseded by Section 215 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 which was essentially the same as the 1941
Act.27  As a result of a 1953 Presidential Proclamation 28 invoking
the 1952 Act, it is presently unlawful to leave or enter the United
States without a valid passport. Consequently, the passport has
assumed a new function: it is a control over egress, and the Secre-
tary of State, by controlling passports can, in effect, control travel
to and from the United States.
16 Kent v. Dulles, supra note 7, at 124.
'. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 350 (1938).
18 Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681 (1938).
39 Jaffe, supra note 2, at 22.2 0 Id. at 23.21 Kent v. Dulles, supra note 7, at 139 (dissenting opinion).
22 Ibid.
23d. at 141; see Passport Refisals for Political Reasons: Constitutional
Issues and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952).24 During the War of 1812, Congress required passports for travel across
enemy lines (3 Stat. 199-200 (1815)); during the Civil War, similar steps
were taken (Kent v. Dulles, supra note 7, at 123); and during World
War'I, passports were required for travel abroad (40 Stat. 559 (1918)).
25 Jaffe, supra note 2, at 18.
26 53 Stat. 252 (1941).
2766 Stat 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964). This act provides that
whenever the President proclaims a national emergency and deems it in the
interests of the United States, he may "require that restrictions and
prohibitions . . . be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their
entry into the United States . . ." and until otherwise ordered, it shall
be unlawful for "any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter
the United States unless he bears a valid passport."
28 Pres. Proc. No. 3004, 67 Stat. c31 (1953).
[ VOL.. 40
RECENT DECISIONS
Since the advent of administrative control over the right to
travel in foreign countries, the Supreme Court has decided two cases
which dealt with the State Department's refusal to grant passports
to communists or to persons affiliated with the communist party.
The first was Kent v. Dulles,29 in which the State Department predi-
cated its power to refuse passports to communist party members on
the Passport Act of 1926. The Court found that a restriction of
the right to travel imposed upon the basis of political belief was not
one of the restrictions previously imposed by the State Department,
nor impliedly sanctioned by the Passport Act. The Court stated
that so far as was material to passport restrictions based on the
character of the individual, passports might be denied in two areas:
where the applicant refused allegiance to the United States; and
where he was a criminal or was trying to escape the law.30 The
Court reaffirmed that the right to travel was constitutionally guar-
anteed, stating that it was', included within the "liberty" protected
by the fifth amendment. 31 Since the applicant in Kent was not a
fugitive from the law, nor had he refused allegiance to the United
States, the denial by the Secretary of State was held an abuse of
discretion.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State 32 was the first Supreme Court
case which actually decided the constitutionality of a restriction on
the right to travel. Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control
Act . 3 made it illegal for any person required to be registered as a
subversive to apply for, use or attempt to use a passport. The
Court declared the act unconstitutional on its face, since it required
these individuals to forfeit their derivative first amendment right of
association in order to obtain a passport.34
The instant case presented issues as to whether the Secretary
of State had the statutory power to refuse to issue passports and,
if so, whether the exercise of that authority was constitutional.
Since there is no express statutory grant of power authorizing pass-
port restrictions, the Court, as in Kent, was faced with the inter-
pretation of the Passport Act 5 and Section 215 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.36  Here, it found that the Passport Act im-
pliedly authorized the passport restriction in question.37 The Court
distinguished Kent by noting that the restriction there, which was
grounded upon political belief or association, was not evidenced by
any long-standing administrative practice which could warrant the
29 357 U.S. 116 (1957).
30 Id. at 127.31 Id. at 125.
32 378 U.S. 500 (1963).
3364 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 68 Stat. 778, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).34 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1963).
3s44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
3 066 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964).
37 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8 (1965).
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conclusion that Congress had given its implied approval.38 On the
contrary, in Zemel, the Court discussed many examples of area re-
strictions both before 11 and after 40 the 1926 Passport Act, in peace-
time and during war. Relying on the history of area restrictions
prior to 1926, the Court found that Congress, by the broad language
of the act, intended to maintain the executive's authority to impose
such restrictions. This construction was derived from the continued
imposition of area restrictions subsequent to 1926, particularly a
1938 Executive Order,4 still in force, which specifically authorizes
these restrictions by the State Department. It was observed that
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act dealt with passports, but
in no way repealed or revised the 1926 Act. These factors, together
with the rule of construction charging courts to give weight to the
interpretation of statutes by those who administer them,4 2 led the
Court to conclude that Congress intended that the executive be given
the authority to impose area restrictions on passports.431
After establishing that Congress had impliedly authorized the
Secretary of State to impose area restrictions, the Court proceeded
to examine the constitutionality of such a grant. It reiterated the
Kent ruling, that the right to travel is a fifth amendment liberty
which cannot be denied without due process of law, but made it clear
that the due process clause does not preclude every restriction.
The Court examined the political situation existing between Cuba
and the United States in order to determine the necessity, as well
as the extent, of any such restrictions. The State Department
had judged that travel to and from Cuba by American citizens would
be an instrumental means of effectuating the goal of the Cuban
government to spread communism. In addition, since American
citizens had been arrested and imprisoned without charges by that
government, and since it is the President's duty to use necessary
and proper means to secure the release of citizens unjustly im-
88 Id. at 16.
9 The Court mentions a 1915 restriction on travel in Belgium due to a
famine in that country; restrictions imposed during World War I on travel
in Germany and Austria which lasted until 1922; and restrictions on travel
in the Soviet Union until 1923.
40 Restrictions were imposed in 1935 on travel to Ethiopia following
the outbreak of war there with Italy; in 1936 on travel to Spain as the
result of the Spanish Civil War; in 1937 to China; in 1952 to Albania,
Bulgaria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and
the Soviet Union; and as late as 1956 to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria for a
brief period.
4' Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681, 687 (1938).
42 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
48$Zemel v. Rusk, supra note 37, at 12; cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 313 (1933). "Acquiescence by Congress in an




prisoned abroad,44 the Court concluded that the Secretary was con-
stitutionally justified in authorizing area restrictions on passports
to Cuba in order to prevent dangerous international incidents 4 5
The Court rejected plaintiff's contention that a first amendment
right was violated by the prevention of an unfettered flow of in-
formation, by indicating that "the right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." 
46
Moreover, plaintiff's argument that the 1926 Act was unconstitution-
ally devoid of sufficient standards and controls for travel restrictions
was rejected on the theory that in the area of foreign affairs, where
conditions are volatile and subject to unforeseeable change, the
President must be afforded broad legislative grants of power in
order to satisfactorily meet any contingency. The Court indicated
that in the sphere of foreign affairs, it is willing to uphold a con-
gressional grant of power that would be struck down as being too
broad in domestic areas. In concluding, the Court did not interpret
the 1926 Act as giving an unrestricted freedom of choice to the
President, but only as authorizing those passport restrictions which
Congress impliedly included in view of prior administrative practice.
4 7
Dissenting opinions were written by three justices, two of
whom believed that Congress did not authorize passport restrictions,
and that the President, by authorizing such restrictions, was in fact
performing a legislative function.48  The third dissent, written by
Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of the majority opinion in Kent,
sought to establish that the right to travel is protected by the first
amendment. According to this dissent, the Court in Kent held
this right to be a fifth amendment liberty because it was, in actuality,
a peripheral right of the first amendment, since a restriction of the
right to travel results in a limitation upon the rights to know, to
converse and to consult with others.45  Mr. Justice Douglas then
argues that any restriction of a first amendment right must be
narrowly drawn and addressed at a "precise evil." The presence
of a communist regime in Cuba, he feels, is not a sufficient evil
to warrant the curtailment of a first amendment right.50
The decision in Kent held a restraint on passports invalid be-
cause there was no specific authority from Congress for such re-
strictions. Faced with the same statute, the Court in Zemel upheld
a restriction, concededly on a different factual basis, despite the
reasoning of Kent, which requires a strict construction of statutes
4 REv. STAT. § 2001 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964).40Zemel v. Rusk, supra note 37, at 12-15.
46 Id. at 17.47 Id. at 17-18.
4Sld. at 20 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black); id. at 28 (dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg).4 1d. at 23-24 (dissenting opinion).
50 Id. at 25.
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curtailing constitutional rights.5 1 Neither the Passport Act nor
the Immigration and Nationality Act expressly allows any type of
passport restriction. If construed narrowly, such a grant of author-
ity is difficult to derive from these statutes. In justification of
this derivation of power, the Court in Zemel argued that an un-
specified grant of power may be implied in the light of the ex-
ecutive's historical assumption of that power. The Court mentions
several cases which have so construed statutes, but in none was a
restriction of a constitutional right sought.52 The mandate of Kent
and many other Supreme Court decisions-to narrowly construe
statutes restricting constitutional rights-appears to have been
displaced by the Court's argument.
Since the enactment of Section 215 of the Immigation and
Nationality Act, and with the Presidential Proclamation of 1953
which declared the state of a national emergency, it is presently
unlawful for a person to leave the country without a passport.
Coupled with the recognition of the executive's power to impose
area restrictions on passports, the President and his delegated agents
may curtail an affirmed constitutional right without any clearly
defined restraints. Neither Congress nor the Court has given
any indication of the extent to which restrictions may be carried.
Without any statutory or judicial restraints, the power to restrict
passports could become an arbitrary control over travel, which the
State Department might effectuate by increasing the number of
restricted areas. 53 This potentiality may become aggravated by the
Court's apparent willingness to accept without question the State
Department's opinion as to what constitutes a national emergency.
In cases where express congressional approval is lacking, courts
should examine extensively the reasons for restricting the right
to travel, and should not permit the violation of any constitutional
right in the absence of a compelling necessity.
CRIMINAL LAW-AGE OF INFANT DEFENDANT NOT GRoUND
FOR HOLDING CONFESSION INVOLUNTARY.-In 1947, the defendant,
then fourteen years old, was taken from his home at 9:30 P.M.,
and was interrogated by police officers until a formal confession
was obtained in the absence of parents or counsel. After the grand
51 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1957).52 The Court cites Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 28 U.S.
294 (1933), which considered tariff duties imposed upon foreign man-
ufacturers; Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932), which dealt with
the deportation of aliens; United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459
(1914) and Udall v. Tallnan, supra note 42, both of which were concerned
with oil and gas leases on government-owned land.
as See 73 HARv. L. REv. 1610, 1611 (1960).
[ VOL. 40
